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Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: New Horizons After Molien
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to recognize emotional
tranquility as an interest entitled to independent legal protection. Pub-
lic policy discourages extending any cause of action that may induce
fraudulent or trivial claims or that may impose unlimited liability.'
Consequently, the emotional distress torts, particularly negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress, have evolved slowly.
With the decision in Dillon v. Legg2 in 1968, California became a
forerunner in developing the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress. In Dillon, the California Supreme Court allowed a bystander
to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress. Dillon sets forth
three factors limiting the scope of duty owed to reasonably foreseeable
plaintiffs: (1) close proximity to the scene of the accident; (2) contem-
poraneous sensory perception of the accident; and (3) a close relation-
ship to the primary victim of the accident.3 Additionally, Dillon
requires that the plaintiffs emotional distress result in physical injury.4
Prior to Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,' California courts were
unwilling to allow recovery in cases factually dissimilar to Dillon; 6 if
any Dillon requirement was not satisfied, courts denied recovery.'
In the 1980 decision of Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,' the
1. See notes 28-34 and accompanying text infra.
2. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
3. See id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
4. See id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
5. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
6. See, ag., Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 542-43, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639,
641-42 (1975) (parents witness child's injury after defendant oral surgeon's negligence renders
child paraplegic); Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 24-25, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 883, 885 (1973) (parents witness slow deterioration and death of child due to defendant
physician's negligent misdiagnosis and treatment); Wynne v. Orcutt Union School Dist., 17 Cal.
App. 3d 1108, 1109, 195 Cal. Rptr. 458, 459 (1971) (parents suffer emotional distress when teacher
informs class that son terminally ill); Deboe v. Horn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 221, 224, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77,79
(1971) (wife called to emergency room and informed that husband totally paralyzed by auto acci-
dent several hours earlier).
7. See, e.g., Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 522, 585 P.2d
851, 859, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1978) (no recovery because injury arose antecedent, unobserved tort);
Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 585, 565 P.2d 122, 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 111 (1977) (no
contemporaneous sensory perception).
8. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
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California Supreme Court expanded the parameters of the tort of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress beyond the bounds set by Dillon.
In Mfolien, the plaintiff husband recovered damages for emotional dis-
tress that he suffered from his wife's being negligently misdiagnosed as
having syphilis,9 even though his emotional distress was unaccompa-
nied by physical injury. The court declared that a cause of action could
be stated for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress, regard-
less of whether a plaintiff suffered resultant physical injury.' 0 In re-
jecting the physical injury requirement, the Supreme Court created a
second, independent cause of action for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress." 1
While Dillon defines a cause of action for percipient witnesses within
the "bystander scenario,"' 2 Molien creates a second cause of action for
those plaintiffs the court classifies as "direct victims" of the negligent
conduct.13 This comment will examine the ramifications of the cause of
action created in Molien and will focus particularly on Molien's effects
on a Dillon cause of action. Despite the Motien court's attempt to dist-
inguish Dillon ,14 a meshing of these two causes of action appears logi-
cal and inevitable. Both causes of action redress emotional injury, and
while differences exist between direct victim and percipient witness
plaintiffs, their similarities are numerous. In light of these similarities,
negligent infliction of emotional distress should be redefined as a single
cause of action. Once duty is established, a uniform set of elements
should be applied to determine whether negligently inflicted emotional
distress is actionable.
Today, society places far greater importance on an individual's emo-
tional well-being than was true in the past. 5 In response, courts in-
creasingly are providing legal redress for tortious interferences with
plaintiffs' emotional tranquility. Nevertheless, the courts' continuing
concern with the policy considerations previously mentioned has
stymied the full growth of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress. An examination of this tort will reveal that it can be expanded
in scope while still maintaining reasonable limitations on the extent of
a defendant's liability and providing adequate assurances that only
9. See id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
10. See id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
11. Seeid.
12. A percipient witness is a person who witnesses an injury to a third party caused by the
tortious conduct of the defendant. Typically, a percipient witness is a bystander that witnesses a
traffic accident.
13. See 27 Cal. 3d at 921-23, 616 P.2d at 815-16, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833-34.
14. The court found two different types of plaintiffs in Dillon and Molien and thus treated the
cases as defining two separate causes of action. See id. at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at
834.
15. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text infra.
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genuine claims will be compensated. To combine and expand the Dil-
lon and Molien causes of action into a single'cause of action, this com-
ment advocates the following changes: Initially, the Molien court's
definition of a "direct victim" must be expanded. 6 Secondly, Molien's
rejection of the physical injury requirement must be extended to all
emotional distress cases.' 7 Finally, the Dillon factors of close proximity
and contemporaneous sensory perception must be applied with greater
flexibility than present law allows in determining whether a duty is
owed to percipient witness plaintiffs.' 8 Additionally, this comment will
examine what remains of the Dillon limitations on the tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress and discuss how the courts should ad-
dress the limitations set forth in Molien.11
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To understand the present state of the law regarding negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress and the proposed expansion of this tort, a
brief discussion of the underlying policy considerations and the history
of emotional distress torts is necessary.
A. Policy Considerations
Early common law refused to recognize a legal right to emotional
tranquility."0 Even after courts began to acknowledge that such an in-
terest existed, reluctance to accord this interest legal protection per-
sisted for various policy reasons.2
Initially, this reluctance stemmed from the belief that emotional dis-
tress was "too subtle and speculative to be capable of admeasure-
ment,"22 if not too trivial an injury with which to burden the judicial
system and society.3 As the court in Lynch v. Knight24 stated, "Mental
pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress,
16. See notes 85-128 and accompanying text infra.
17. See notes 129-158 and accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 159-179 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 180-198 and accompanying text infra.
20. See generally Victorian Ry. Comm'n v. Coultras, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888), Lynch v.
Knight, I 1 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861); Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury: Legal Liabilityfor Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 194 (1944) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
21. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §54, at 327 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; Smith, supra note 20, at 228 n. 128; Magruder, Mfental and Emo-
tional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936) [hereinafter cited as
Magruder]; Comment, Negligently Inflicted fental Distress: The Casefor an Independent Tort, 59
GEo. L. J. 1237, 1244 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Independent Tort].
22. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 41-42 (1956).
23. See generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §18.4, at 1032 (1956); PROS-
SER, supra note 21, §54, at 329; Independent Tort, supra note 21.
24. 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861).
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when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone .. ."I' To-
day, it is well-recognized that it is no more difficult to measure mental
suffering than it is to measure physical pain.26 Additionally, with ad-
vances in modern psychology, the triviality argument has now been re-
futed as an "antiquated concept."27
In addition to the difficulties the early courts had in setting damages
and preventing trivial claims, they were also concerned with discourag-
ing fraudulent claims and limiting the potential extent of a defendant's
liability, even if the resultant effect of implementing such policies
meant that many valid claims would go unrediessed. The concerns of
fraudulent claims28 and unlimited liability29 remain the strongest pol-
icy arguments for limiting recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Recent cases criticize the propriety of barring all claims for
fear that some fraudulent claims will be presented.30 The Dillon court
pointed out that "the possibility that fraudulent assertions may prompt
recovery in isolated cases does not justify a wholesale rejection of the
entire class of claims in which the potentiality arises. 31
While courts have been able to grapple with the problem of fraudu-
lent claims, the unlimited liability issue is more complex. Once legal
protection is accorded for emotional injury, a line must be drawn at
some point so that the burden of liability on defendants is not unrea-
sonable. In the past, courts have devised two tests32 to limit the number
of situations in which plaintiffs can recover for emotional distress negli-
gently inflicted:33 the physical impact or injury test, and the "zone of
danger" test. Compliance with these judicially created tests assures
courts of the genuineness of a claim.34
25. Id. at 863.
26. See Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Miller, 120 Ga. 453, 47 S.E. 959, 961 (1904); PROSSER,
supra note 21, §54, at 328. See generally Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20
MICH. L. REv. 497, 513 (1922).
27. Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 933, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 481
(1975).
28. See id.; Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry., 168 Mass. 285,288,47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897); Waube v.
Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935).
29. See 48 Cal. App. 3d at 934, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 482; Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615,
249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969); 216 Wis. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.
30. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 736, 441 P.2d 912, 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 77-78
(1968); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 241, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1961). See
generally PROSSER, supra note 21, §54, at 327-28.
31. 68 Cal. 2d at 736, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78. The courts' initial concern
that liability of defendants would be disproportionate to their culpability has proven unfounded in
states that now allow recovery for emotional distress. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 402,
520 P.2d 758, 764 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §436A (1965).
32. The physical injury or impact test, see notes 39-41 and accompanying text infra, and the
zone of danger test, see notes 57-62 and accompanying text infra.
33. See Liebson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to
Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163, 168 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Liebson].
34. See 48 Cal. App. 3d at 934, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 482 (impact or injury test as guarantee of
genuineness).
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Emotional distress claims generally arise in one of two situations,
either the plaintiff is the primary victim of the defendant's tortious con-
duct or the plaintiffs emotional distress arises from injury to a third
party. The physical injury or impact test is applicable to both situa-
tions; the "zone of danger" test is applied only to the latter. Tests em-
ployed when emotional distress results to theprimary victim of a tort
will be discussed first because courts initially extended recovery in
these cases. A discussion of cases wherein the emotional distress results
from harm to a third person will follow.
B. History of Emotional Distress Torts
1. Emotional Distress to the Primary Victim of a Tort
Courts have long recognized a cause of action for the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress." When a defendant's conduct is extreme
and outrageous, courts grant recovery for intentionally inflicted, severe
emotional distress absent any consequent physical harm.36 If, however,
the conduct in question is intentional and unreasonable, but not outra-
geous, plaintiffs may only recover when foreseeable physical injury re-
sults.37 In the intentional infliction cases, the "outrage" element is the
court's assurance of a genuine claim.3"
Historically, plaintiffs were compensated for negligent infliction of
emotional distress only when they demonstrated that some physical in-
jury or impact resulted from the emotional injury.3 9 The physical in-
jury requirement provided a means of assuring adequate proof of the
validity of the claim.40 If no physical impact was found, mental dis-
tress was compensable only as damages parasitic to damages for physi-
cal injury.41
35. The Restatement (Second) of Torts has recognized such a cause of action. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 (1965). See generally Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L.
REv. 40 (1956); Magruder, supra note 21. But see Theis, Intentional Infiction of Emotional Dis-
tress: A Needfor Limits on Liability, 27 DEPAUL L. REv. 275 (1977).
36. See Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498, 468 P.2d 216, 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88,
90 (1970); State Rubbish Collector's Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 337-38, 240 P.2d 282, 285-86
(1952); Comblith v. First Maintenance Supply Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 564, 565, 74 Cal. Rptr. 216,
217 (1968).
37. See 2 Cal. 3d at 497, 468 P.2d at 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90; 38 Cal. 2d at 336-37, 240 P.2d at
285. Molien's rejection of the physical injury requirement, however, should also apply to cases of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, physical injury should no longer be an
absolute requirement for recovery when the defendant's conduct is not outrageous. See notes 129-
158 and accompanying text infra.
38. See 38 Cal. 2d at 338, 240 P.2d at 286.
39. See 48 Cal. App. 3d at 932, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 481. See generally Magruder, supra note 21,
at 1036.
40. See Independent Tort, supra note 21, at 1239. But see Batalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237,
241, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1961).
41. See PROSSER, supra note 21, §54, at 330; Magruder, supra note 21, at 1049.
The treatment of any element of damages as a parasitic factor belongs essentially to a
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Even prior to Molien, California, as well as most other states, recog-
nized an independent right of recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress in certain exceptional situations. Courts allowed
recovery for emotional distress in cases of negligent transmission of tel-
egrams, particularly when telegrams carried messages of death.42
Courts also granted recovery when plaintiffs suffered emotional distress
as a result of the negligent mishandling of a corpse.4 3 In these cases,
physical injury was not required for recovery; the circumstances them-
selves served to ensure that the emotional injury was not feigned.44
Recently, California rejected the physical injury or impact require-
ment for cases in which the plaintiff meets the "substantial damage"
test.45 If the negligent act caused both emotional distress and substan-
tial damage to another legal interest of the plaintiff, such as a property
or financial interest, the plaintiff can recover for emotional distress
even though no physical injury or impact occurred. 46 Substantial dam-
age to another legal interest guarantees the validity of the emotional
distress claim47 and dispels the necessity of finding physical injury or
impact. Recovery for emotional distress in these cases is, however,
merely another parasitic form of recovery for injury to an interest that
merits independent legal protection.
The courts still adhering to the physical injury or impact test have
become more liberal in determining what constitutes physical impact4"
or injury.4 9 Thus, even in these jurisdictions, the requirement of physi-
cal injury or impact has become merely an artificial test rather than a
guarantee of genuineness.50 Hawaii was the first state to acknowledge
transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor that is today recognized as parasitic will,
forsooth, tomorrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability.
STREET, I FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906).
42. See generally Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975);
Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943). But see generally cases
allowing recovery only when mental distress results in physical harm, Kaufman v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 947 (1955); Western Union v. Speight, 254
U.S. 17 (1920).
43. See Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 214, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 450 (1980).
44. See id. at 214-15, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 450; 37 N.Y.2d at 382, 334 N.E.2d at 592, 372
N.Y.S.2d at 642.
45. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433-34, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13,
19 (1967).
46. See, e.g., id.; Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 580, 510 P.2d 1032, 1042, 108
Cal. Rptr. 480, 490 (1973); 48 Cal. App. 3d at 937, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
47. See 66 Cal. 2d at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19; 48 Cal. App. 3d at 937, 122
Cal. Rptr. at 484.
48. Impact has been found in insignificant contact having no real relation to the emotional
harm, e.g., Porter v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in eyes);
Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of smoke); Hess v. Philadel-
phia Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948) (electronic shock).
49. See Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 797, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115, 117 (1967)(shock to nervous system is physical rather than mental injury).
50. See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 241, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37
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the artificiality of the physical injury or impact requirement. Hawaii
accords the interest in freedom from emotional distress independent, as
opposed to merely parasitic, legal protection. Rodrigues v. State,5' de-
cided by the Hawaii Supreme Court in 1970, held that a plaintiff was
entitled to an independent recovery for emotional harm caused by a
defendant's negligence without having to prove physical injury.52 In
deciding Molien, California became the first state to adopt Hawaii's
approach eliminating the physical injury requirement in cases when the
plaintiff was a direct victim of the negligent act.53
Hawaii has also rejected the physical injury requirement in emo-
tional distress cases arising from injury to a third party.54 To date,
neither California nor any other state has adopted this approach. The
following section will discuss the various approaches that states, other
than Hawaii, have taken in cases of emotional harm arising from injury
to a third party.
2. Emotional Distress Resulting from Harm to a Third Person
Courts are more reluctant to allow recovery in cases when a plaintiff
suffers emotional harm that arises out of a defendant's negligence to-
ward a third person than in cases when the plaintiff alone is injured.
The potential for fraudulent or trivial claims and unlimited liability is
considered a greater danger when the plaintiff is not the primary victim
of the defendant's negligent conduct.55
In cases of emotional harm resulting from harm to a third person,
typically the plaintiff is a bystander-witness to an accident. The minor-
ity view requires physical impact to the plaintiff claiming emotional
distress and thus denies recovery to physically uninjured bystander-
witness.56 Today, the majority approach is embodied in the "zone of
danger" test.57 Although this test does not require actual physical im-
(1969). "Fraudulent claims are not likely to be eliminated by application of the rule, since the
slightest impact, or the most attenuated of physical injuries have been found sufficient to satisfy
the rule's requirement." Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 933, 122
Cal. Rptr. 470, 481-82 (1975).
51. 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
52. See id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520.
53. See notes 77-84 and accompanying text infra.
54. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 403, 520 P.2d 758, 762 (1974). "Mhe requirement
of resulting physical injury is employed as yet another of the artificial devices to guarantee the
genuineness of the claim, which may actually foreclose relief to a genuine claim." Id. at 404, 520
P.2d at 763.
55. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 314-15, 379 P.2d 513, 524-
25, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 44-45 (1963). Accord, Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d
419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613-14, 258 N.W.
497, 501 (1935).
56. Ohio, Tennessee, Missouri, Florida, Kentucky and Georgia have retained the impact rule
in this area. See generally Liebson, supra note 33, at 168-72.
57. See, ag., 59 Cal. 2d at 302-03, 379 P.2d at 517, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 37 (subsequently over-
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pact to the plaintiff, the plaintiff must have been within such a close
range to the accident that there was a high risk of physical impact.5 8
Only in this "near miss" situation is a duty established under the zone
of danger test. Furthermore, a plaintiff seeking recovery under the
zone of danger theory, although not required to show physical impact,
must still prove that the emotional harm caused a physical illness or
injury.59
As a result, application of the zone of danger rule has often led to
anomalous results; typical is Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co. 60
InAmaya, a mother saw a truck run over her child, yet she was denied
recovery under the zone of danger rule.6" Since the mother did not fear
for her own safety, but only for that of her child, the defendant in-
curred no liability for the mother's emotional distress.62 California
eventually rejected the zone of danger test in Dillon v. Legg.63
If the Dillon court had applied the zone of danger rule, the mother
who witnessed the death of her child would have been unable to re-
cover for the mental anguish she experienced; however, her five year
old daughter would have had the right to recover merely because she
was standing several feet closer to the place where the defendant's car
struck her sister." Refusing to apply the zone of danger rule, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held in Dillon that a mother could recover for
mental distress arising from fear for her child's safety which also re-
sulted in physical injury.65 Rejecting the zone of danger test as an arbi-
trary determinant of duty, the court looked to the foreseeability of the
plaintiff's mental injury to ascertain if the defendant owed the plaintiff
a duty. The court set forth three guidelines to determine whether risk
of injury is reasonably foreseeable: (1) close proximity to the scene of
the accident; (2) contemporaneous sensory perception; and (3) a close
relationship to the primary victim.
66
Although many states have chosen not to adopt the California ap-
ruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)); 216 Wis. at 612-13,
258 N.W. at 500-01.
58. Plaintiffs may recover under the zone of danger test if their emotional harm resulted from
fear for their own safety as well as fear for the safety of a third person. See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS §436, Comment f at 459-60 (1965).
59. See 59 Cal. 2d at 302-03, 379 P.2d at 517,29 Cal. Rptr. at 39; Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw.
398, 404, 520 P.2d 758, 762 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §436A (1965).
60. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
61. See id. at 298-302, 379 P.2d at 514-16, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 34-36.
62. See id. at 304-06, 379 P.2d at 518-19, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 38-39. Accord, Webb v. Francis J.
Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 184, 4 P.2d 532, 533 (1931); Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298,
301-02, 176 P. 440, 441 (1918); Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 47, 319 P.2d 80, 81 (1957).
63. See note 65 and accompanying text infra.
64. See 68 Cal. 2d at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
65. See id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
66. See id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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proach outlined in Dillon, a few states have adopted the Dillon ap-
proach with various modifications.67 One state, fearing unlimited
liability, however, has expressly rejected the Dillon approach. New
York, in Tobin v. Grossman,68 predicted that the Dillon factors could
not withstand a case-by-case analysis and that Dillon would leave Cali-
fornia without the means to limit the scope of liability in percipient
witness cases. 9
While New York has rejected the Dillon factors as being inadequate
safeguards against unlimited liability, California has found that these
factors extend sufficient protection. Recognizing that a loose applica-
tion of the Dillon factors might lead to unlimited liability, California
courts have demanded strict compliance with the Dillon guidelines70
and have been reluctant to allow even the slightest deviation. InArchi-
bald v. Braverman,7 however, the court did deviate slightly from the
close proximity guideline by allowing recovery to a mother who had
appeared on the scene "within moments" after her son had been in-
jured by an explosion.72 Nevertheless, extension of Dillon beyond Ar-
chibald v. Braverman has been strongly resisted. In Powers v. Sissoev,73
for example, a mother was denied recovery for shock that resulted from
seeing her daughter thirty to sixty minutes after injury in an- accident. 74
The courts' strict interpretation of Dillon has endured despite the
broad language in Dillon calling for determinations of foreseeability on
a case-by-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances. The Dillon court
expressly observed that "no immutable rule can establish the extent of
67. Rhode Island has added a fourth factor to the Dillon test-foreseeability of the plaintiff's
presence. See D'Ambra v. U.S., 354 F. Supp. 810, 820 (D.R.I. 1973). The court listed five factors
to determine foreseeability of presence: (1) age of child; (2) type of neighborhood; (3) familiarity
of the tortfeasor with the neighborhood; (4) time of day; (5) all other circumstances that would
put the tortfeasor on notice of the likelihood of the parent's presence. See ig. Hawaii has called
for a more flexible application of the Dillon factors and has rejected Dillon's physical injury re-
quirement. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 403-10, 520 P.2d 758, 763-66 (1974). Connecti-
cut's approach closely models Dillon. For the approaches of other states see D'4micol v. Alvarez
Shping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (1973); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647,
207 N.W.2d 140 (1973).
68. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
69. See id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558. See generally Simons, Psychic
Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute Between California and New York, 51 ST.
JOHN'S L. RE. 1 (1976). New York has chosen instead to refuse recovery for emotional distress to
all percipient-witness plaintiffs. See 24 N.Y.2d at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
70. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
71. 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
72. Compare id. at 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 724-25 with Arauz v. Gerhart, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937,
948-49, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619, 627 (1977).
In Arauz, a mother arrived at the scene of the accident within minutes of its occurrence, but
recovery was denied for lack of contemporaneous sensory perception. The court distinguished
Archibald in that the results of the explosion were so gory that the plaintiff could "mentally recon-
struct" the scene of the accident, thus satisfying the contemporaneous sensory perception require-
ment.
73. 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974).
74. See id. at 873-74, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
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that obligation for every circumstance in the future."75 Not until
Molien, however, did the California courts apply Dillon without blind
application of the Dillon factors.76 In Molien, the California Supreme
Court stated:
The significance of Dillon for the present action lies not in its de-
lineation of guidelines fashioned for resolution of the precise issue
then before us; rather, we apply its general principle of foreseeability
to the facts at hand. .. .
Just as the significance of Dillon is in its general principle, and not in
adherence to its guidelines, the significance of Molien lies not so much
in its rejection of the physical injury requirement and establishment of
an independent cause of action for direct victim plaintiffs, as it does in
its upholding the principle that emotional distress should be redressed.
Just as Molien extended Dillon, Molien itself will be extended.
EXTENDING THE MOLIEN CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, the defendant physicians
negligently misdiagnosed syphilis in examining the plaintiff's wife.
They advised her to inform her husband of the diagnosis so that he
could come in for blood tests to determine whether he, too, had con-
tracted syphilis. The misdiagnosis led to marital discord and an even-
tual filing for dissolution of the marriage. As a result of the
misdiagnosis and its effects upon his marriage, the plaintiff suffered
emotional distress.78
Mr. Molien sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress and
loss of consortium. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dis-
missal of the emotional distress action for failure to show physical in-
jury and failure to meet the Dillon test of foreseeability. 79 The
California Supreme Court, in a five to two decision,8" reversed on both
causes of action. The court held that loss of consortium, based on emo-
75. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968).
76. See Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 923, 616 P.2d 813, 816, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 834 (1980).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 919-20, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
79. See id. at 918-21, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33. The cause of action for
loss of consortium was not dismissed by the trial court. The California Supreme Court considered
this an oversight and amended the dismissal to apply to both causes of action.
80. The new makeup of the California Supreme Court will affect future interpretation of
Molen. Manuel, J. (concurring) has since diedand Clark, J. (dissenting opinion) -has left the
bench.
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tional injury to one's spouse, was actionable." More importantly, the
court held that an independent "cause of action may be stated for neg-
ligent infliction of serious emotional distress."
8 2
Significantly, the court first rejected the Dillon requirement that neg-
ligently inflicted emotional distress must result in physical injury or ill-
ness.8 3 Secondly, the court defined Mr. Molien as a "direct victim"84 of
the defendant's negligence although he was not the primary victim of
the misdiagnosis. By defining the plaintiff as a "direct victim," the
court established that a duty was owed to the plaintiff without showing
that the plaintiff was foreseeable within the bounds set by the Dillon
factors.85
B. Defining Who is a Direct Victim
. Molien's Definition of a Direct Victim
Rather than overruling Dillon, the Molien court, in granting recovery
without applying the Dillon factors, stated that Dillon was "apposite
but not controlling."8 6 The court then distinguished the plaintiff in
Molien as a "direct victim," as opposed to the "percipient witness"
plaintiff in Dillon .7 The Molen court classified the plaintiff as a direct
victim because his emotional distress was reasonably foreseeable;88 the
defendants knew or should have known that their diagnosis of Mrs.
Molien would cause her husband emotional distress.8 9 The defendants
therefore owed a duty to the plaintiff to use due care in diagnosing his
wife's condition.90
81. See 27 Cal. 3d at 932-33, 616 P.2d at 822-23, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41.
82. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
83. See id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
84. See id. at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834. Accord, Johnson v. State, 37
N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975). In Johnson, the New York Court used
similar language. Plaintiff recovered for mental distress suffered when the defendant-hospital sent
a false message of her mother's death to her aunt. In distinguishing the plaintiff from the by-
stander plaintiff, the court stated:
[Ijnjury was inflicted by the hospital directly on claimant... [c]laimant was not indi-
rectly harmed by injury caused to another, she was not a mere eyewitness of or bystander
to injury caused to another. Instead, she was the one to whom a duty was directly owed
by the hospital....
Id. at 383, 334 N.E.2d at 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 643. (emphasis added).
85. See 27 Cal. 3d at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
86. Id. at 921, 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
87. See id. at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
.88. See id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
89. See id. at 920, 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833. In fact, the doctors told her ex-
pressly to inform her husband.
90. See id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 13
2 Extending Direct Victim Status Beyond Cases of Negligence
Affecting the Marital Relationship
Arguably, the direct victim status given the plaintiff in Molien was an
exceptional situation because syphilis, as medical evidence of infidelity,
is more likely than most diseases to have a direct effect on the marital
relationship.9 ' Accordingly, the appellate court dissent in Molien sug-
gested that the court should grant recovery to a class of plaintiffs lim-
ited to spouses who suffer foreseeable emotional and marital harm.92
Several factors, however, point away from confining the Molien defi-
nition of a direct victim to one who suffers emotional distress because
of a foreseeable disruption of the marital relationship. Had the court
intended to limit application of its decision to tortious acts of defend-
ants affecting plaintiffs' marital relationships, it could have based re-
covery on a much narrower holding. The court could have enlarged
the scope of the cause of action for spousal loss of consortium to in-
clude damages for emotional distress arising from the tortfeasor's con-
duct. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,93 was the first case in
which California accepted the cause of action for loss of consortium.
The court there stated that loss of consortium was "principally a form
of mental suffering."94 Alternatively, the court could have carved out
another exception to the general rule denying independent legal redress
for negligently caused emotional distress just as it has done in cases
involving mishandling of corpses and negligent transmission of false
messages. 95 The Molien court indicated that the circumstances of
Molien provided adequate indicia of a reliable and genuine claim;96
91. See id. at 925, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835. An argument might also be made
that plaintiff was a direct victim because he feared that he might have syphilis as well. However,
the court does not stress this point. Moreover, other non-infectious misdiagnoses may have the
same detrimental effect on the marital relationship. See also Nieman v. Upper Queens Med.
Group, 220 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1961), in which plaintiff was mistakenly informed that lab tests indi-
cated sterility. Under these facts, plaintiffs wife could be classified as a direct victim if the negli-
gent misinformation caused her emotional harm.
92. See Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 158 Cal. Rptr. 107, 116 (1979) (Poche, J. dissent-
ing). Similarly, the recent case of Wynn v. Monterey Club, 111 Cal. App. 3d 789, 168 Cal. Rptr.
878 (1980), cites Molien as authority for allowing recovery for emotional distress that foreseeably
arose out of a breach of contract and led to the destruction ofplaintiff's marriage. In exchange for
the Monterey Club's promise to refuse to allow his wife to gamble, the plaintiff agreed to pay his
wife's previous losses for which he was not personally liable. The club breached its promise,
knowing that Mrs. Wynn's gambling was prompting the Wynn's marital difficulties. In circum-
venting California's nonrecognition of a cause of action for alienation of affections, Wynn focused
on the emotional and marital harm aspects of Mollen. See id. at 800-01, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
The dissent in Mollen recognized that the majority's decision would have the effect of reviving a
cause of action of alienation of affections. See 27 Cal. 3d at 936 n.3, 616 P.2d at 825 n.3, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 843 n.3 (Clark, J., dissenting).
93. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
94. See id. at 401, 525 P.2d at 681, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
95. See notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
96. See 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
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the same rationale underlay the creation of the other exceptions.97
In sum, the court painted in broad strokes by establishing negligent
infliction of emotional distress as an independent cause of action.9"
Consequently, one can infer that the direct victim status accorded the
plaintiff in Molien is not limited to a syphilis misdiagnosis of one's
spouse. Indeed, a direct victim should be defined as a person with a
close relationship to the primary victim of the tort, such that a defend-
ant could reasonably foresee that his or her tortious conduct would
cause serious emotional distress to that person.99 For instance, direct
victim status should be accorded to a plaintiff who suffers emotional
distress as a result of misdiagnosis of cancer or other terminal illnesses
affecting a close relation."°
3. Extending Direct Victim Status to the Parent-Child Relationship
Attempts have been made to limit direct victim status to the spousal
relationship. Traditionally, the husband-wife relationship has been ac-
corded special qualities and privileges not extended to the parent-child
relationship. 01 In refusing to extend the cause of action for loss of
consortium to the parent-child relationship, the court in Borer v. Ameri-
can 4irlines 102 stated that "[t]he law has always been most solicitous of
the husband-wife relationship, perhaps more so than the parent and
child relationship. . . . In any event, policy rather than logic is the
determinative factor. ... o But neither policy nor logic warrant
such a narrow interpretation of a direct victim plaintiff.
Because the risk of emotional harm to a parent is as foreseeable as
that to a spouse, direct victim status should be extended to the parent-
child relationship."° No rational basis exists for distinguishing the
husband-wife relationship from the parent-child relationship. The par-
97. See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 171, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (1970).
98. See 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839. See also Lagies v. Copley,
110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1980) (Molien cited for "broad" principle: "[Tihere is a
duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of serious mental distress.").
99. Additionally, the same reasoning used to classify plaintiffs as direct victims in cases of
negligent misdiagnosis can be applied to cases involving negligent treatment.
100. See also Callahan v. Burton, 157 Mont. 513, 487 P.2d 515 (1971) (husband and wife bring
medical malpractice action for misdiagnosis of malignant melonoma of wife's eye); Hwetling v.
Jenny, 206 Neb. 335, 293 N.W.2d 76 (1980) (husband brings wrongful death action for misdiagno-
sis of cancer from which wife died); Mantz v. Follingstad, 84 N.M. 473, 505 P.2d 68 (1972) (hus-
band and wife sue for medical malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress because
defendant unnecessarily removed wife's breast).
101. For instance, evidentiary privileges exist to protect the husband-wife relationship, and no
corollary privileges exist to protect the parent-child relationship. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§970-
973, 980-987.
102. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
103. See id. at 446, 563 P.2d at 861, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 305; Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of
Am., 46 N.J. 82, 92, 215 A.2d 1, 7 (1965).
104. But see Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 24, 106 Cal. Rptr.
883, 885 (1973).
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ent is within the doctor's contemplation when diagnosing a child.° 5 In
fact, a doctor usually informs the parent directly of his or her diagnosis.
California courts, however, have been reluctant to grant recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress in a parent-child relationship
when the Dillon factors are not satisfied. 0 6 Prior to Molien, the courts
denied recovery unless the parent was a bystander witness to his or her
child's accidental harm. Since Molien's direct victim plaintiff is al-
lowed recovery in circumstances other than the witnessing of a sudden,
unexpected accident, the invalidity of denying recovery to non-by-
stander parent-plaintiffs for negligent misdiagnosis of their children is
apparent.
In Justus v. Atchison, °7 an expectant father was in the delivery room
to witness the birth of his child. While the father was present, a mishap
occurred in the baby's delivery as a result of the defendants' negligence.
Shortly thereafter, the father was informed of his infant's death. 0 8 Ap-
plying Dillon, the court denied recovery since the father did not have
contemporaneous sensory perception of the accident.' 0 9 If classified as
a direct victim urider Molien, however, the plaintiff in Justus could
have recovered. Recovery would have been justified since it is reason-
ably foreseeable that a father would suffer serious emotional harm
from the death of his child. That the emotional harm resulted from the
father's being told of the death rather than his actually perceiving what
had happened at the moment the infant died would be irrelevant. 110
Moreover, there is little doubt that the emotional harm is genuine
under such circumstances.
Similarly, application of the direct victim theory would have
changed the result in Hair v. County of Monterey."'I In Hair, the child
was rendered paraplegic due to the defendant oral surgeon's negligent
treatment. The court, strictly applying the Dillon guidelines, denied re-
covery because the parents saw only the resultant injury to their child
and not the commission of the tort itself." 2 Under the M1olien direct
victim rationale, the defendant would have had a duty to the parents to
use due care in treating their child since failure to do so would
105. See also Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 919, 616 P.2d 813, 814, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831, 832 (1980).
106. See, e.g., Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 949, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619, 627 (1977);
Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 543-44, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639, 642 (1975); Powers
v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 873-74, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868, 874 (1974); 31 Cal. App. 3d at 24, 106
Cal. Rptr. at 884-85.
107. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
108. See id. at 584, 565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
109. See id. at 585, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at I11.
110. See id.
111. 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975).
112. See id. at 543, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
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foreseeably cause them serious emotional distress, thereby enabling the
parents to recover as direct victims.
In Jansen v. Children's Hospital Medical Center,"13 the court refused
to allow recovery to a mother under the Dillon theory when she suf-
fered emotional distress from witnessing the slow deterioration and
eventual death of her daughter that resulted from the defendant's neg-
ligent misdiagnosis and treatment. 1 4 The court expressed its concern
that allowing recovery would lead to unlimited liability."I5 The court
displayed the same fears, however, in regard to the husband-wife rela-
tionship:' 16
But to extend the rule of Dillon to the entire area of injury to a parent
by improper diagnosis of a child's ailment (and perhaps as logically,
to the emotional impact upon a spouse and children of an ill parent)
is an extreme broadening of the rule which the Supreme Court ap-
parently sought to limit."
7
Since Molien has extended liability to misdiagnosis in the spousal
relationship, it is illogical to contend that the fears expressed by the
Jansen court render extending protection to the parent-child relation-
ship unacceptable. Adequate safeguards remain to avoid unlimited lia-
bility after Molien." 8 Nevertheless, in cases subsequent to Molien,
courts have demonstrated an unwillingness to extend the Molien cause
of action to the parent-child relationship.
In the recent appellate court case of Cortez v. Macias,1 9 a mother
sued for negligent inffiction of emotional distress resulting from the
negligent diagnosis and treatment of her infant son. 120 The court stated
"[tihe language in Molien is sufficiently broad, it would appear, to per-
mit similar reasoning to be applied to the facts.of the case before us." 2 '
Nevertheless, the court returned to the Dillon test and denied recovery
because the mother's emotional shock did not arise from contempora-
neous observance of the negligent conduct; rather, it arose from later
being told her baby was dead. 22 In arriving at this decision, the court
pointed out that the Aolien court had cited Justus v. Atchison "without
overruling, modifying or distinguishing that decision beyond the de-
gree that that court distinguished Dillon."'23 Thus, the court con-
113. 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973).
114. See id. at 23, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
115. See id. at 24, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. See notes 180-198 and accompanying text infra.
119. 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980).
120. See id. at 664, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
121. Id. at 649, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
122. See id. at 650, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
123. Id. at 649, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
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cluded, it was still necessary to apply the Dillon test when there is a
parent-child relationship between the plaintiff and the primary victim
of the negligent misdiagnosis and treatment. 24
There is support in Molien, however, for an alternative approach to
the rationale used in Cortez. Specifically, the Molien court denounced
"a rote application of the [Dillon] guidelines to a case factually dissimi-
lar to the bystander scenario."' 5 Misdiagnosis of a patient is factually
dissimilar to a "sudden and brief event"' 2 6 such as the auto accident in
Dillon. Therefore, to require plaintiffs to meet the Dillon test in cases
involving negligent diagnosis and treatment by physicians is inappro-
priate. Consequently, the plaintiff in Cortez should not have been de-
nied recovery on the grounds stated. 2 7 Instead, the court should have
classified the plaintiff as a "direct victim" and allowed recovery.
In brief, parents as well as spouses of negligently misdiagnosed and
treated patients should be included within the direct victim class of
plaintiffs when emotional distress to the plaintiff is reasonably foresee-
able. The Molien court's direct victim theory should extend recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress to parents who are not
percipient-witness plaintiffs. If classified as a direct victim, a plaintiff
should not be required to meet the Dillon requirements of contempora-
neous sensory perception and close proximity to the scene of the acci-
dent. '8 Thus, with this extension, plaintiffs can state a cause of action
for negligent infliction of emotional distress either as a direct victim
plaintiff or as a percipient-witness plaintiff.
Molien distinguished Dillon only in its application of the Dillon fac-
tors to determine foreseeability. Compliance with Dillon is necessary
to establish foreseeability, and thus a duty owed, only when the plain-
tiff is a percipient-witness, not when the plaintiff is a direct victim. 129
Once duty is established, either by meeting the Dillon guidelines or by
classifying the plaintiff as a direct victim, the determination of liability
124. See id. at 650, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
125. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 923, 616 P.2d 813, 816, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 834 (1980).
126. See Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 24, 106 Cal. Rptr.
883, 884 (1973).
127. Justus can be further distinguished because the plaintiff was a "voluntary witness" to the
accident. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 585, 565 P.2d 122, 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 111
(1977).
128. This is to be distinguished from cases in which a child or spouse is injured in an antece-
dent accident and the parents or spouse sees only the resultant injury hours later. See generall,
Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d 851, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978);
Deboe v. Horn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971). But see Capelouto v. Kaiser Foun-
dation Hosp., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 892 n.l, 500 P.2d 880, 882 n.1, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858 n.l (1972)
(footnote indicates cause of action might exist for mental distress from witnessing injuries arising
from antecedent, unobserved tort if physical injuries result).
129. See 27 Cal. 3d at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
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under general tort principles should be identical. Accordingly, the
Molien court's rejection of the physical injury requirement should be
extended to the Dillon cause of action.
C The Physical Injury Requirement
In Molien, the California Supreme Court observed that refusal to
recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
when consequential physical injury was lacking was "an anachro-
nism."' 30 The court further noted that rejection of claims at the plead-
ing stage for lack of physical injury usurped the function of the jury.131
The court deemed the physical injury requirement "both overinclusive
and underinclusive when viewed in light of its purported purpose of
screening false claims."' 32 The physical injury requirement is overin-
clusive in that any physical injury suffices, no matter how insignifi-
cant;133 the requirement is underinclusive in that valid, provable claims
might be denied at the pleading stage.' 34
The court also noted the difficulty in drawing a line between physio-
logical and psychological injury.135 Physicians themselves often have
problems in making such differentiations. 36 Consequently, the Molien
court concluded:
the attempted distinction between physical and psychological injury
merely clouds the issue. The essential question is one of proof;
whether the plaintiff has suffered a serious and compensable injury
should not turn on this artificial and often arbitrary classification
scheme. 13
7
Moreover, rapid advances have been made in medicine and in the un-
derstanding of mental illness since the court originally formulated the
physical injury requirement. Medical science has come to accept that
mental injury can be as debilitating as physical injury 138 and has shown
that emotional trauma can be adequately established and measured. 139
Molien holds that physical injury is not required for recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress as long as there is some "guar-
antee of genuineness" 140 found in the circumstances of the case to serve
130. See id. at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
131. See id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
132. Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
133. See id. See generally Magruder, supra note 21, at 1059.
134. See 27 Cal. 3d at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
135. See id.; Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., Ill Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320, 322 (1896). See
generally Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REv. 497 (1922).
136. See Independent Tort, supra note 21 at 1241 n.24. See generally 27 Cal. 3d at 929-30, 616
P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
137. 27 Cal. 3d at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
138. See generally Independent Tort, supra note 21.
139. See Independent Tort, supra note 21, at 1248-53.
140. Accord, Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 172, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970); Ferrara v. Gal-
luchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999 (1958); See generally Corn-
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as corroborating evidence of the mental injury. The court found the
necessary "guarantee of genuineness" in the "objectively verifiable ac-
tions by the defendants that foreseeably elicited serious emotional re-
sponses in the plaintiff."'' Accordingly, Molien mandates that courts
now leave to the jury questions of whether a plaintiff's claim is genuine
and whether a defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff serious emo-
tional distress. 142
In discarding the physical injury requirement, California adopted
the standard of proof enunciated by the Hawaii Supreme Court ten
years earlier in Rodrigues v. State: 43 plaintiffs must show "some guar-
antee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case."' 44 The Rodri-
gues court arrived at this standard by examining the exceptions to the
general rule of denying recovery without physical injury or impact."45
By recognizing that exceptions were created when the particular cir-
cumstances of a case guaranteed the genuineness and seriousness of the
claim, the court proposed to use these exceptions as examples of trust-
worthy, compensable claims which could be encompassed within a
new, independent cause of action rather than restricting recovery to ex-
ceptional situations. 46
California has delegated to the trier of fact the duty of determining
the genuineness of a claim and whether there is reliable proof of serious
emotional injury. 14 7 Jurors must rely on their own experience and ex-
pert medical testimony in making the "genuineness" determination.14 8
In addition, jurors may look for the presence of other guarantees al-
ready recognized by the court: (1) physical injury; 14 9 (2) substantial
damage arising from an independent, related cause of action;t50 or
(3) outrageous conduct in cases of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.' 5' Although the court created the "guarantee of genuineness"
ment, Neurosis Following Trauma: .4 Dark Horse in the Field of Mental Disturbance, 8 CuM. L.
REV. 495, 509 (1977).
141. See 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839. The court found further
support for the validity of the claim in that to falsely impute syphilis is slander per se. It appears,
however, that the court added this factor merely to bolster their argument; the genuineness and
seriousness of the claim could have been sustained without this corroborating factor. See id. at
931, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839; CAL. CIV. CODE §46(2).
142. See 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
143. 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
144. See 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839; 52 Haw. at 172, 472 P.2d at
519-20.
145. See 52 Haw. at 171, 472 P.2d at 519.
146. See id. See generally Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1961).
147. See 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
148. See id
149. See id. at 926-27, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
150. See id. For cases involving the substantial damage rule, see note 45 supra.
151. See 27 Cal. 3d at 927, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837. For cases involving outra-
geous intentional conduct, see note 36 supra.
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test as a substitute for the physical injury requirement in a case involv-
ing a direct victim plaintiff, application of the test was not expressly
limited to the facts of Molien. Rejection of the physical injury require-
ment and substitution of the "guarantee of genuineness" test may, in
effect, be extended to the Dillon line of cases.
. Extension to the Dillon Fact Pattern
In all cases relying on the Dillon theory, California courts have
maintained physical injury as a "threshold element of recovery."' 52
The Molien decision, however, calls into question the validity of the
Dillon requirement that a percipient witness plaintiff must suffer physi-
cal injury or illness resulting from emotional harm as a prerequisite to
bringing a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
If jurors can determine the genuineness of a claim without physical
injury when the plaintiff is a "direct victim," they are seemingly capa-
ble of doing so when the plaintiff is a percipient witness. Physical in-
jury therefore should no longer be an absolute requirement for
recovery in Dillon cases.
In 1974, Hawaii discarded physical injury as a condition to recovery
by a percipient witness. In Leong v. Takasaki,53 the Hawaii Supreme
Court extended its holding in Rodrigues v. State'54 to percipient wit-
nesses. In Leong, a four year old plaintiff recovered for emotional
harm suffered even though he suffered no physical injury from witness-
ing the death of his step-grandmother when she was hit by the defend-
ant's automobile.' 55 Since California closely paralleled Rodrigues in
deciding Molien, a similar expansion in California of Molien's rejection
of the physical injury requirement to the Dillon-type case would be
neither unreasonable nor unexpected. Molien itself has left room for
such an expansion. The court did not limit the rejection of the physical
injury requirement to cases similar to Molien; rather, the court rejected
physical injury as a requirement for a cause of action for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress. 156 The distinction made by the court
between Dillon and Molien went only to establishing duty and not to
rejecting the physical injury requirement. 57
152. Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 542, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639, 642 (1975).
Seegenerall, Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977);
Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 500 P.2d 880, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1972);
Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978).
153. 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
154. 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
155. See 55 Haw. at 403, 520 P.2d at 760.
156. See Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 928-30, 616 P.2d 813, 820-21,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 838-39 (1980).
157. See id. at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
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In sum, the reasons given for rejecting the physical injury require-
ment in cases when the plaintiff is a direct victim apply equally to situa-
tions involving percipient-witness plaintiffs. The sole purpose of the
physical injury requirement is to act as an arbitrary limit on liability,
and both Dillon and Molien sought to eliminate the use of artificial,
arbitrary bars to recovery.' 58 Thus, after Mfolien, lack of physical in-
jury should no longer bar recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress; consequently, the Dillon physical injury requirement should be
discarded.' 159
In addition to questioning the physical injury requirement of Dillon,
Molien questions whether California courts should continue to adhere
strictly to the Dillon factors as a means of limiting the scope of the
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress for
percipient-witness plaintiffs. Molien advocates a more flexible, case-
by-case approach in determining whether recovery should be allowed.
The next section will examine the effect Molien may have on the future
application of the Dillon factors.
APPLICATION OF THE DILzON GUIDELINES
A. Close Proximity and Contemporaneous Sensory Perception
In cases involving percipient-witness plaintiffs, the Dillon guidelines
still limit liability. Two of the Dillon guidelines, contemporaneous sen-
sory perception and close proximity to the scene, however, should be
used in a more flexible fashion. Rather than applying these two guide-
lines as absolute requirements for recovery, as courts have done in the
past, 160 the courts should treat them merely as factors in determining
foreseeability and thus duty. Although Molien implies that all three
Dillon guidelines must be met to recover. 161 Dillon itself called only for
the courts to "take into account such factors as the following [list of
factors] ...[t]o indicate the degree of the defendant's foreseeabil-
ity .... "162 Furthermore, the Dillon court stated:
158. See id. at 927, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837; Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 737,
441 P.2d 912, 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 78 (1968).
159. In the recent case of Aldaco v. Tropic Ice Cream Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 523, 168 Cal. Rptr.
59 (1980), plaintiff attempted to recover for emotional distress absent resultant physical injury in a
Dillon bystander situation. The court refused to apply Molien because the cause of action arose
before Molien was decided and instead dismissed the case for lack of physical injury. The court,
however, did not suggest that Molien would be inapplicable in subsequent cases.
160. See, e.g., Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 522-23, 585 P.2d
851, 859, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1978); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 585, 565 P.2d 122, 136, 139
Cal. Rptr. 97, 111 (1977); Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 948-49, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619, 627
(1977); Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 24, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883, 885
(1973).
161. See 27 Cal. 3d at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
162. See 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
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We are not now called upon to decide whether, in the absence or
reduced weight of some of the above factors, we would conclude that
the accident and the injury were not reasonably foreseeable and that
therefore defendant owed no duty of due care to plaintiff. In future
cases, the courts will draw lines of demarcation upon facts more
compelling than the subtle ones alleged in the complaint before
US. 163
Despite the above-quoted language in Dillon, courts have not begun
drawing lines to suit fact situations other than the bystander scena-
rio. 64 The Molien decision has shown, however, that strict adherence
to the Dillon guidelines is not necessary to avoid unlimited liability.
Foreseeability, and hence duty, can be determined on a case-by-case
basis.16
5
Hawaii has successfully used the Dillon guidelines as mere factors to
consider rather than as absolute requirements for recovery. More flex-
ible use of the Dillon requirements of close proximity and contempora-
neous sensory perception to limit potential liability closely models the
Hawaii approach in Leong v. Takasaki.166 The Hawaii Supreme Court,
in rejecting the zone of danger rule and in adopting a modified Dillon
approach, declared that the Dillon guidelines should not be used to bar
recovery but instead should be used as indicia of the degree of mental
distress suffered. 167 Hawaii created an objective standard based on the
standard articulated in Rodrigues:
[W]hen it is reasonably foreseeable that a reasonable plaintiff-witness
to an accident would not be able to cope with the mental stress en-
gendered by such circumstances, the trial court should conclude that
defendant's conduct is the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury and
impose liability on the defendant for any damages arising from the
consequences of his negligent act.'
68
Hawaii has set reasonable limitations on the broad definition of duty
163. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
164. [T]he courts have not often taken the Dillon challenge to fashion guidelines appro-
priate to different kinds of cases involving emotional distress caused by negligence to-
ward another. Some of the medical cases seem only with effort to have been forced
down upon the Procrustean bed of "accident" guidelines.
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 158 Cal. Rptr. 107, 115 (1979) (Poche, J. dissenting), rev'd, 27
Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
165. See 27 Cal. 3d at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834; 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441
P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. Accord, Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 620, 249 N.E.2d 419,
425, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 563 (1969) (Keating, J. dissenting) (limit on case-by-case basis "using
proximate cause and foreseeability as a means to avoid anomalous results.").
166. 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). Unlike the Hawaii approach, this comment does not
suggest flexible application of the close relationship factor. See notes 187-189 and accompanying
text infra.
167. See 55 Haw. at 410, 520 P.2d at 766. See generally Comment, Kelley v. Kokua Sales &
Supply, Lid: Redefning the Limits to Recoveryfor Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, I I TULSA
L.J. 587 (1976).
168. 55 Haw. at 410, 520 P.2d at 765.
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set forth in the Leong case. In the same year Leong was decided the
Hawaii Supreme Court denied recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress in Kel'y v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd 169 In Kelley,
plaintiff's decedent died of a heart attack in California after hearing
that his grandchild in Hawaii had been killed when struck by the de-
fendant's tractor. 70 The court realized that imposing liability in such a
situation would place an unreasonable burden on defendants.1 7 1 To
avoid unreasonably broadening a defendant's scope of duty, the Kelley
court additionally required the plaintiff to be within a "reasonable dis-
tance" of the scene of the accident. 172 The "reasonable distance" re-
quirement allows greater leeway for a case-by-case analysis than do the
Dillon factors of close proximity and contemporaneous sensory percep-
tion as presently applied by the California courts. Thus, Hawaii has
demonstrated that limiting liability in percipient witness cases, without
strictly adhering to arbitrary guidelines, is not only possible but is also
reasonable. 173
A more flexible approach to determining duty will eliminate many of
the injustices of prior decisions. Compare, for instance, the holdings of
Justus v. Atchison 174 and Austin v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia.'7  Each case involved the death of a child during birth in the
plaintiff-father's presence due to the defendants' negligence. In Austin,
the plaintiff recovered because he felt with his hand the cessation of
life. 17 6 In Justus, the court denied recovery because the plaintiff's
mental distress occurred only after the doctor told him the baby had
just died and not from his personal perception of the infant's death.177
To contend that the plaintiff's emotional distress was any less genuine
in the Justus case than it was in the Aus/in case is irrational, yet recov-
ery was denied in Justus because the Dillon factor of contemporaneous
sensory perception was not satisfied.' 78 By looking at the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case, and by using the Dillon factors of contempo-
raneous sensory perception and close proximity as general guidelines,
rather than as absolute requirements, courts can limit recovery in a less
drastic manner. 179
169. 56 Haw. 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975).
170. See id. at 206, 532 P.2d at 674-75.
171. See id. at 208, 532 P.2d at 676.
172. See id. at 209, 532 P.2d at 676.
173. See Comment, Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply Ltd.: Redefining the Limits to Recoveryfor
Negligenty Inflicted Mental Distress, I 1 TULSA L.J. 587, 602 (1976).
174. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
175. 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1979).
176. See Id. at 358, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
177. See 19 Cal. 3d at 585, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
178. See Id. at 584, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
179. See generally Comment, The Development of Reco veryfor Negligently Inflicted Emotional
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B. Close Relationsho
Although the close proximity and contemporaneous sensory percep-
tion factors arguably should be given less emphasis, the third Dillon
factor, requiring a close relationship of the plaintiff to the primary vic-
tim of the tort, should be given greater weight. The close relationship
factor seems to be the only Dillon guideline that has a rational connec-
tion to the scope of duty owed. While the close proximity and contem-
poraneous sensory perception factors are closely tied to "accident"
cases, close relationship is an integral factor in determining duty in all
cases of emotional distress in which the plaintiff is not the primary vic-
tim of the tortious conduct. 1 0 Thus, both direct victim and percipient-
witness plaintiffs must show a close relationship to the party primarily
injured by the defendant. A blood relationship may not be necessary,
but the court must be convinced that an emotional attachment exists
akin to a familial relation. 8' The close relationship requirement rea-
sonably restricts the class of potential plaintiffs because emotional in-
jury to those with a close relationship to the primary victim is more
foreseeable than injury to those with a remote or nonexistent relation-
ship. Thus, the close relationship factor should remain as an absolute
requirement for recovery and should serve to limit the scope of liability
in all cases of negligent infliction of emotional distress in which the
plaintiff is not the primary victim of the defendant's tortious conduct.
In addition to the close relationship requirement, there are several
other means by which the court can limit liability. The next section
discusses the limitations that remain on the newly expanded tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
LIMITATIONS ON THE NEW CAUSE OF ACTION OF NEGLIGENT
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
This comment has proposed expanding the negligent infliction of
emotional distress cause of action by enlarging the direct victim class of
plaintiffs, rejecting the physical injury requirement for percipient wit-
nesses, and relaxing the application of the Dillon factors of close prox-
Distress Arisingfrom Peril or Injury to Another: An Analysis of the American and Australian Ap-
proaches, 26 EMORY L.J. 647, 676-79 (1977). But see Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App.
3d 728, 736-37, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435, 440 (1980); PROSSER, supra note 21, §54, at 335. In Hathaway,
decided subsequent to Molien, the court denied recovery for failure to meet the contemporaneous
sensory perception requirement of Dillon. The plaintiff parents ran out of their house and found
their child electrocuted by a negligently installed water cooler.
180. See generally Liebson, supra note 33, at 197.
181. See Mobaldi v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 582, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 720, 726 (1976) (foster mother recovers for witnessing negligent medical treatment of foster
child). Accord, Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 410, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (1974) (recovery by plain-
tiff for witnessing death of step-grandmother).
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imity and contemporaneous sensory perception. Expansion of the tort,
however, need not result in unlimited liability. The Molen decision
and its proposed implications release negligent infliction of emotional
distress from the straightjacket of arbitrary tests formerly used to limit
liability without disturbing the underlying policy considerations. The
more flexible limitations that remain are adequate safeguards against
unlimited liability and fraudulent or trivial claims.
A. Duty and Causation Limitations
Molien propounds a principle of flexibility in determining whether a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is actionable. Hence,
Molien's case-by-case approach potentially extends the scope of duty
owed. In addition, a flexible application of the Dillon factors of close
proximity and contemporaneous perception allows courts to find a duty
owed in a greater number of situations.
Despite the potential for establishing duty more readily, the court,
nevertheless, can foreclose the plaintiff from recovery at the outset by
finding that no duty exists.' 8 2 Accordingly, courts can determine that a
plaintiff is not a reasonably foreseeable direct victim or percipient wit-
ness. Thus, duty limitations still exist on the tort of negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Molien and its proposed implications on the Dil-
lon factors simply give courts discretion in determining whether a duty
is owed. Instead of barring recovery for failure to meet an artificial
test, courts should now weigh all the facts and circumstances in each
case in making the duty determination.
Additionally, as in any other tort, the principle of proximate causa-
tion will limit the scope of the cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.'83 A plaintiff may find it difficult to prove that a
defendant's tortious conduct proximately caused the emotional distress
suffered. This is especially true in cases involving plaintiffs who are
strongly predisposed to suffering emotional illness or injury. The court
can limit a defendant's liability to hypersensitive plaintiffs by applying
an objective standard that restricts liability to emotional distress an or-
dinary person would suffer. 184
In Rodrigues, the Hawaii Supreme Court created an objective stan-
dard to limit liability to emotional distress a reasonable person would
suffer: "Serious mental distress may be found where a reasonable man,
182. See Wynne v. Orcutt Union School Dist., 17 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1111, 95 Cal. Rptr. 458,
459 (1971) (parents suffered emotional distress when teacher disclosed to class that child was ter-
minally ill. Court held no duty owed).
183. See Comment, Neurosis Following Trauma:L A Dark Horse in the Field of Mental Distur-
bance, 8 CuM. L. REv. 495 (1977); Independent Tort, supra note 21, at 1258.
184. But see Smith, supra note 20, at 260.
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normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the
mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case."'l 5  Al-
though the California Supreme Court did not expressly adopt Hawaii's
objective standard in the Molien decision, such acceptance may be in-
ferred from the court's adoption of the cause of action for negligent
infliction of serious emotional distress based on the Rodrigues deci-
sion.'86 Under this standard, a hypersensitive plaintiff will not recover
for emotional distress beyond that which a reasonable person would
suffer.
In addition to the courts' power to limit the scope of the cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress by limiting defend-
ants' duties and by applying a reasonable man standard, the jury also
possesses limiting controls. The jury will determine whether adequate
proof of serious emotional distress exists on the facts of a case.
B. Adequate Proof of Serious Emotional Distress
The Molien decision limits the new cause of action for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress to cases in which there is adequate proof
of serious emotional distress.'8 7 Courts can thereby extend recovery
within reasonable limits and avoid potential recovery for trivial or friv-
olous claims.'88 In personal injury claims, the degree of injury merely
determines the amount of compensation; in emotional distress claims
the degree of injury indicates whether there is an actionable tort at
all.'8 9 Consequently, the definition of serious emotional distress will
determine the extent of recovery allowed. 190
The Hawaii Supreme Court, in Rodrigues, fashioned the require-
ment of serious emotional distress into an objective standard.' 91 Ha-
waii derived its objective standard from the standard stated in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts' 92 for determining severe emotional dis-
185. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970).
186. See Molen v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 839 (1980).
187. See id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
188. But see Theis, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: 4 Needfor Limits on Liability,
27 DEPAUL L. REV. 275, 291-92 (1977).
189. See 27 Cal. 3d at 928, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837; Indendedent Tort, supra nate
21, at 1255.
190. See Independent Tort, supra note 21, at 1255 n.102; Comment, Negligence and the Inflic-
tion of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 512, 517
(1968).
191. See note 185 and accompanying text supra.
192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46, Comment j at 77 (1965): "The law inter-
venes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to
endure it. The intensity and duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its
severity."
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tress for intentional infliction of emotional distress.193 In view of the
similarity between the Hawaii and Restatement standards, "severe"
and "serious" in this context may be inferred to have analogous mean-
ings. Thus, definitions of severe emotional distress found in cases of
intentional conduct can assist in defining serious emotional distress in
cases of negligent conduct.194 Hence, severe or serious means "substan-
tial or enduring, as distinguished from trivial or transitory."'' 95 Al-
though juries will determine if there is sufficient proof of serious
emotional distress, courts can confine the area of jury decision by giv-
ing accurate definitions in jury instructions.
As stated in Molien, the jury must find not only serious emotional
distress but also some "guarantee of genuineness" in the circumstances
of the case to support a finding of serious emotional distress.' 96 This
added evidentiary protection not only limits the number of recoverable
claims, but also guards against recovery for fraudulent claims. 19 Thus,
unless juries can point to some aspect of the plaintiff's case that serves
to guarantee genuineness, juries will presumably deny recovery.
CONCLUSION
This comment has demonstrated that the new independent cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress reasonably can be
expanded without disturbing public policy considerations that have
previously been invoked to deter such expansion. The new cause of
action treats the Dillon and Molien fact patterns as two branches of a
single tort. Thus, once the court establishes a defendant's duty by clas-
sifying the plaintiff as a direct victim or a percipient witness, it can
apply the remaining elements of the tort identically. Therefore,
Molien's rejection of the physical injury requirement regarding "direct
victims" should apply equally to percipient-witnesses. Additionally,
expanding the class of plaintiffs who can commence actions under this
new tort by broadly defining "direct victims" and by flexibly applying
the Dillon factors of close proximity and contemporaneous sensory per-
ception appears appropriate. At the same time, the class of potential
plaintiffs should be limited to primary victims themselves or to those
with a sufficiently close relationship to a primary victim of the tort.
193. See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970).
194. See also Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 (1965).
195. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 397, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
196. See Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 839 (1980).
197. See also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). "Corroborating circumstances" must be shown in or-
der for declarations against penal interest to be admissible as a hearsay exception.
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In summary, the elements necessary for recovery under the proposed
cause of action of negligent infliction of emotional distress are as fol-
lows: (1) plaintiff must be a direct victim or percipient witness;
(2) plaintiff must have a close relationship to the primary victim (if not
actually the primary victim); (3) plaintiff must suffer serious emotional
harm; (4) the circumstances must provide a guarantee of the genuine-
ness of the claim; and (5) plaintiffs emotional distress must be caused
by defendant's negligence.
"Legal history shows that artificial islands of exceptions created from
the fear that the legal process will not work, usually do not withstand
the waves of reality and, in time, descend into oblivion."' 198
Pamela Cogan Thigpen
198. Hambrook v. Stokes, I K.B. 141, 158-59 (1923).
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